

Message Text

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46

ACTION SS-25

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2106

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 5190

EXDIS/SALT

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SUBJ LINE)

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: SALT: HIGHLIGHTS OF SEPT 28 POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS

(SALT TWO-289)

1. SUMMARY: POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS COVERED MIRVS, OUTSTANDING US AND SOVIET PROPOSALS AND NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS. SHCHUKIN CLAIMED THAT JAN 1, 1973 CUTOFF DATE ON MIRVS OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. GRINEVSKY INDICATED THAT SEMENOV'S STATEMENT TODAY CONSITUTED A NEGATIVE REPLY TO US PROPOSALS. END SUMMARY

2. MIRVS. NITZE (TO SHCHUKIN, A-347) SAID HE WAS SURPRISED BY THE BREADTH OF THE SOVIET MIRV PROGRAM AND ASKED SHCHUKIN WHETHER HE COULD COMMENT ON THE REASONS THEREFOR. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT ONE COULD GO ABOUT A DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN TWO DIFFERENT WAYS; THE FIRST WAY WAS TO TAKE A SERIES OF SMALLER STEPS, CORRECT THE DEFICIENCIES REVEALED IN THESE FIRST STEPS AND THEN GO ON TO FURTHER STEPS. THE SECOND WAY WAS TO UNDERTAKE A BROAD AND CONCURRENT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. THE SECOND WAS WAS MORE EXPENSIVE BECAUSE IT TOOK MORE WORK IN CORRECTING THE DEFICIENCIES. IT WAS, HOWEVER, THE METHOD THE SOVIET UNION HAD OPTED FOR IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR MIRV PROGRAM.

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3. NITZE THEN NOTED THAT MANY IN THE US WERE CONCERNED BY THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE USSR'S MIRV TESTING PROGRAM. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT BECAUSE ONE TESTED SOME-THING IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO DEPLOY IT. NITZE COMMENTED

THAT ONCE MIRV MISSILES WERE TESTED, THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM BECAME MORE DIFFICULT. SHCHUKIN COUNTERED BY SAYING THAT IT WAS ALSO DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO VERIFY THE NUMBER OF MINUTEMAN III AND MINUTEMAN II SILOS WHICH COULD CONTAIN MIRVED MISSILES. NITZE RECALLED SHCHUKIN HAD ONCE TOLD HIM HE WAS NOT CONCERNED BY THE THREAT MINUTEMAN III POSED TO SOVIET SILOS. HE SAID THIS UNDOUBTEDLY RELATED TO THE FACT THAT MINUTEMAN III RV'S WERE RELATIVELY SMALL. NITZE WENT ON TO SAY THAT RV'S OF THE SIZE WHICH COULD BE LAUNCHED FROM A LARGE BALLISTIC MISSILE PRESENTED QUITE A DIFFERENT THREAT. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT, IN THE LONG RUN, EVEN SMALL MISSILES COULD BE GIVEN SUFFICIENT ACCURACY TO CONSTITUTE A THREAT. NITZE SAID HE THOUGHT ALTHOUGH THIS MIGHT BE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE, THERE WERE REAL PROBLEMS IN ASSURING SUFFICIENT RELIABILITY AND ACCURACY FOR SUCH SMALL RV'S. WITH LARGE RV'S THE THREAT WAS IMMEDIATE.

4. IN RESPONSE TO NITZE'S QUESTION RE POSSIBLE FUTURE SOVIET COMMENTS ON MIRV LIMITATIONS, SHCHUKIN SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE BEST APPROACH WOULD BE FOR THE US TO MAKE A REVISED PROPOSAL CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S REAL SITUATION. HE NOTED THAT THE US HAD PROPOSED IN ITS PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT A CUT-OFF DATE OF JAN 1, 1973 AND THAT THE US HAD REFERRED TO A PERMANENT AGREEMENT CONTAINING MIRV LIMITATIONS AS FAVORABLE TO THE US SIDE AS THOSE CONTAINED IN OUR PROPOSED PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT. SHCHUKIN SAID IT WAS UNTHINKABLE THAT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT WOULD REFER TO A PAST DATE SUCH AS JAN 1, 1973. NITZE POINTED OUT THAT IF THE 1973 DATE WERE ABANDONED AND THERE WERE SUBSTITUTED THEREFOR A CONCEPT OF EQUAL MIRV LIMITATIONS, THIS WOULD THEN CLEARLY IMPLY EQUAL LIMITATIONS ON THE OTHER PARAMETERS GOVERNING MISSILE FORCES, INCLUDING THE NUMBER AND THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBM'S. NITZE FURTHER REPEATED HIS POINT THAT HE THOUGHT IT APPROPRIATE FOR THE SOVIET SIDE TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE ON GIVING THEIR VIEWS AS TO MIRV'S. SHCHUKIN REPEATED HIS POINT THAT THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES IN THIS ON THEIR SIDE, BUT HE THOUGHT THIS REALLY SHOULD NOT BE AN EMBARRASSMENT TO EITHER SIDE.

5. NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS. SMOLIN (TO GRAYBEAL, A-344) EMBARKED
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UPON DISCUSSION OF NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS FOCUSED ON MEANING OF US MAY 15 TERM "DEFINITIVE SOLUTION." SMOLIN CLAIMED SOVIET SIDE HAD EARLIER TRANSLATED THE WORD "DEFINITIVE" AS "FINAL" WHEREAS TODAY WORD HAS BEEN TRANSLATED BY US SIDE AS "CONCRETE"

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ACTION SS-25

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OR "SPECIFIC." SMOLIN ALSO NOTED THAT ENGLISH VERSION OF MAY 15 AND SEP 28 U.S. STATEMENT USED THE WORD "A"WHICH, IF HE UNDERSTOOD ENGLISH CLEARLY, MEAND THIS WAS "ONE" SOLUTION, BUT NOT NECESSARILY THE ONLY ONE.

6. GRAYBEAL EMPHASIZED THAT SMOLIN SHOULD NOT INTERPRET ANYTHING SAID TODAY, INCLUDING THE TRANSLATION THEREOF, OR HIS ANALYSIS OF LAIRD'S TESTIMONY (A-335) AS REFLECTING ANY CHANGE IN THE U.S. MAY 15 POSITION ON NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS.

7. SHCHUKIN (TO NITZE, A-347) SAID IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR SOVIET SIDE TO ACCEPT U.S. DISTINCTION BETWEEN CENTRAL AND NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS. HE SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THE WORDS "CENTRAL" AND "NON-CENTRAL" WERE NOT OF THE ESSENCE, BUT THAT AGREEMENT ON SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS COULD BE. SHCHUKIN NOTED THAT THE SIDES WERE NEGOTIATING A PERMANENT AGREEMENT, AND THAT A DISTINCTION SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN POSSIBLE LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENTS AND THE SITUATION WHICH MIGHT EXIST IN THE INTERMEDIATE FUTURE.

8. BELETSKY TO ROWNY (A-348) SAID THE CENTRAL, NON-CENTRAL DISTINCTION WAS AN ARTIFICIALITY WHICH DID NOT ACCORD WITH AN OBJECTIVE VIEW OF WHAT CONSTITUTES EQUAL SECURITY FOR BOTH SIDES. ROWNY SAID, SOVIET AIDE NOT BEING OBJECTIVE BUT SUBJECTIVE WITH CONTRIVED DEFINITIONS SUCH AS "WEAPONS CAPABLE OF STRIKING THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE." U.S. PROPOSALS WERE UNDERWRITTEN BY SECRET

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THE JUNE AGREEMENT WHICH RECOGNIZED THE BROADER STRATEGIC ASPECTS INVOLVED BY SPEAKING TO "EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS." TRUSOV ASKED WHAT WAS WRONG WITH MAKING AGREEMENTS WHICH INCLUDED ALL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND LATER BELETSKY SAID ALL PROBLEMS MUST BE TACKLED SIMULTANEOUSLY. ROWNY REPLIED THAT OBJECTIVE WAS TO LIMIT THOSE SYSTEMS, IN AN EQUITABLE WAY, WHICH WERE THE MOST POWERFUL AND THE MOST DESTABILIZING AND THAT TO TACKLE EVERYTHING AT ONCE WAS TO TACKLE NOTHING, ESPECIALLY WHEN SUCH VAGUE TERMS AS "GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS" WERE INTRODUCED.

9. OUTSTANDING U.S. AND SOVIET PROPOSALS. GRINEVSKY (A-345) EXPRESSED HOPE THAT KLOSSON RECOGNIZED TODAY'S STATEMENT

CONSTITUTED NEGATIVE SOVIET REPLY TO U.S. PROPOSALS. GRINEVSKY DREW ATTENTION PARTICULARLY TO PASSAGE IN STATEMENT WHICH POINTED OUT THAT HOWEVER CONCRETE OR DETAILED MIGHT BE A PROPOSAL, IF IT PRESERVED AN ADVANTAGE FOR ONE SIDE, IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE.

10. IN RESPONSE TO GRAYBEAL'S QUESTION AS TO WHEN SOVIET SIDE WOULD SAY SOMETHING SPECIFIC (A-344), SMOLIN REPLIED THAT SOVIET STATEMENT TODAY CONTAINED SIGNIFICANT RESPONSES TO U.S. PROPOSALS AND SHOULD BE CAREFULLY STUDIED IN THIS LIGHT.

11. FUTURE SOVIET STATEMENTS. IN RESPONSE TO A DIRECT QUESTION BY FITZGERALD (SEPTEMBER 25, A-341), MAZERKIN SAID THAT AFTER SEMENOV COMPLETES HIS RESPONSE TO U.S. PROPOSALS, SOVIET SIDE AUTHORIZED TO DELIVER NEW PROPOSALS AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME.

12. GRINEVSKY TOLD KLOSSON (A-341) THAT SOVIET SIDE WOULD MOVE FASTER IN THE FUTURE AND NEXT TUESDAY PLANNED TO DISCUSS ICBMS AND SLBMS IN RELATION TO THE IA.

13. DURATION OF CURRENT PHASE. DURING FITZGERALD'S CONVERSATION ON SEPTEMBER 25 WITH SOV DEL MEMBERS (A-341), MAZERKIN SAID THAT IF U.S. SEP 25 STATEMENT AN INDICATION THAT U.S. SIDE HAS NOTHING NEW TO PRESENT AFTER IT HEARS SEMENOV'S RESPONSE TO U.S. PROPOSALS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS SEMENOV HAS TO PRESENT, IT MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA TO DECLARE A RECESS SO THAT THE SOVIET SIDE COULD BE IN MOSCOW FOR THE NOVEMBER PARADE. JOHNSON

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